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 1. Introduction 
 
In an information transmission situation between a sender and a receiver, suppose that 
the sender cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information. We might naturally 
expect that the sender would signal more truthfully than when it does not care about its 
credibility, and thus the receiver would be better off. In reality, however, this sender, who 
cares about its credibility, would be endowed with an invisible power to control the 
receiver's actions exactly due to its credibility concern, and can consequently manipulate 
information without being detected. As a result, the sender could achieve its favored 
outcomes without losing its credibility while the receiver would lose its favored outcomes 
that were otherwise achievable in the absence of the sender's credibility concern.   
Therefore, when the sender cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information, 
the sender might signal less truthfully and the receiver would be worse off. This is the 
paradox of credibility. 
To see how the sender's concern for its credibility endows the sender with an invisible 
power to influence the receiver's actions, consider a Hawk-Dove game with incomplete 
information. In the standard Hawk-Dove game, there are two players, 1 and 2, and they 
choose either Hawk or Dove simultaneously. Regarding their preferences, they both 
prefer to play differently from what the other does. Into this Hawk-Dove game, we 
introduce 2's types so that 2 can be either normal with high probability or aggressive with 
low probability. If 2 is normal, its preference is the same as in the standard Hawk-Dove 
game. If 2 is aggressive, it views Hawk as a dominant action. Player 2's type is its private 
information and 2 signals to 1 its type before they choose Hawk or Dove. 
In this Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information, suppose that 1 tries to play 
Hawk regardless of 2's signals. Then, responding to this l's strategy, 2 will play Hawk 
when it is aggressive and will play Dove when it is normal. That is, 2 reveals its type 
through its actions. So, if 2 signals untruthfully, it would lose its credibility in reporting 
truthful information. In this situation, if 2 does not care about its credibility, 2 can signal 
untruthfully. Let 2 signal the normal type always. Accordingly, responding to 2’s 
strategy, l's strategy, to play Hawk regardless of the signals, is one of the best responses 
because the probability of 2's being aggressive is small. Therefore, their strategies 
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and in this equilibrium outcome, 1 can achieve 
its favored outcome. 
However, if 2 cares about its credibility, 2 will signal truthfully. Then, when 2 has 
signaled the aggressive type, 1 has an incentive to change its action from Hawk to Dove 
in order to play differently from what 2 does. Consequently, in equilibrium, 1 cannot 
ignore 2's signal. Once 1 responds to the signal, then 2 can influence l's actions by 
manipulating its information. For example, if 1 plans to play Dove when 2 has signaled 
                                                            
∗ I am grateful to Antonio Marasco and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. 
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the aggressive type and plans to play Hawk when 2 has signaled the normal type, then by 
signaling the aggressive type player 2 can influence 1 to play Dove. Here, 1 cannot 
distinguish 2's real types, thus 2 will not lose its credibility. Therefore, if player 2 cares 
about its credibility in reporting truthful information, then 2 is endowed with the invisible 
power to control l's actions, and as a result 2 can always achieve its favored outcome 
without losing its credibility.  
Section 2 discusses the related literature.  Section 3 formally models the paradoxical 
role of the sender's credibility.  Finally, Section 4 presents summaries and conclusions. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Information transmission situations have been studied in cheap talk games, such as 
Crawford and Sobel (1982), Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Farrell and Rabin (1996), etc. 
The cheap talk game presumes a special assumption that signals from the sender are 
irrelevant to the sender's payoffs. Thus, the receiver does not need to believe sender's 
signals, and consequently, only when they have common interests, sender's signals can be 
effective. Therefore, the sender might not be able to achieve its favored outcome (see also 
Farrell, 1993; Austen-Smith, 1994; Seidmann and Winter, 1997). The present study 
adopts the basic setting of a cheap talk game. However, it departs from the cheap talk 
game by assuming that the sender cares about its credibility, and thus signals from the 
sender are relevant to the sender's payoffs. This intention of the sender for its credibility 
makes signals from the sender effective even when the sender and the receiver have 
contradictory preferences. Therefore, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without 
losing its credibility. 
Sobel (1985) and Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) also studied the sender's credibility 
in their models. In Sobel's paper (1985), a sender has multiple possible types and has an 
incentive to pretend to be a truth-telling type to improve its future payoffs. In other 
words, with a primary concern of improving its future payoffs, the sender adopts 
truthtelling actions as the means to achieve its goal, giving others the fabricated 
impression about its type. This is how a sender appears to care about its credibility 
without any genuine and direct concern for its credibility (see also Benabou and Laroque, 
1992; Kim, 1996; and Conlon, 1993). The current study, on the other hand, assumes that 
the sender directly cares about its credibility and focuses on the effect of the credibility 
concern on the information transmission situation. 
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Similarly, Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) also assumed that a sender directly cares 
about its credibility. They assumed that the sender suffers from untruthful signaling itself 
because it has a preference for honesty.  Consequently, they showed that the sender might 
signal more truthfully than in the cheap talk game due to its credibility concern (see also 
Kartik,  Ottaviani, and Squintani 2007). In the present study, in contrast to their work, the 
sender does not put any intrinsic value on honesty. Thus, the sender has no incentive to 
tell the truth as long as its lie would not be detected, and therefore the sender might signal 
less truthfully than in the cheap talk game. The sole concern for credibility without any 
intrinsic value on honesty gives the sender an invisible power to manipulate information 
and produce the paradoxical outcome. Hanjoon Michael Jung / CMER Working Paper No. 08-61 
Originally, this study stems from Jung (2007). Jung (2007) studied information 
manipulation through the media and showed that if a sender reports information through 
the media and cares about its credibility, then the sender can successfully manipulate 
information without being detected. In addition, Siddiqi (2007) applied Jung's idea to 
stock markets to explain stock price manipulation by intermediaries (senders). Siddiqi 
(2007) also conducted experiments and found that the intermediaries actually manipulate 
information and raise their payoffs in those experiments. This study departs from Jung 
(2007) and Siddiqi (2007) by excluding the role of the media in the information 
transmission situation. Even so, this study still shows that the sender can successfully 





Two players (1 and 2) play a Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information. In this 
game, 2 has two possible types while 1 has only one type. So, 2 can be either aggressive 
or normal while 1 is always normal. Player 2's type is its private information and the 
probability of 2's being aggressive is p ∈ (0, 1]. Incomplete information lies only in 2's 
type. When both players are normal, they play a Hawk-Dove game. On the other hand, 
when 2 is aggressive, they play a modified version of Hawk-Dove game in which 2 has a 
preference for playing Hawk. In this model, before the players play the Hawk-Dove 
game, 2 signals to 1 either that 2 is aggressive (A) or that 2 is normal (N). Then in the 
Hawk-Dove game, they each choose either to play Hawk (H)  or  to play Dove (D) 
simultaneously. So, this game proceeds as follows. At stage zero, 2's type is chosen. Only 
2 detects its own type. At stage one, 2 signals either A or N to 1. At stage two, both 1 and 
2 each simultaneously choose D or H. After all actions are taken, payoffs are realized. 
Regarding the payoffs, player l's payoffs depend only on both its actions and 2's 
actions, and they together determine the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game. On the other 
hand, 2's payoffs depend on its signals as well as both its actions and l's actions. This is 
done by assuming that 2 cares about its credibility that is determined by its signals as well 
as the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game. In the absence of 2's concern for its credibility, 
the players' payoffs, determined by the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game, are given by 
the following matrixes. In these matrixes, 1 chooses a row and 2 a column, where the first 
 
  When player 2 is aggressive    When player 2 is normal 
     
  D H      D H 
D  3,α (∈ \ )  1, α′(> α )    D  3, 3  1, 4 
H  4,β (∈ \ ) 0,β′(> β )    H  4, 1  0, 0 
 
Table 1: Payoff Matrixes in the Absence of 2's Credibility Concern 
 
entry in each cell is l's payoff for the corresponding actions and the second entry is 2's. 
In addition to these payoffs, player 2's credibility concern also affects its final 
payoffs. In equilibrium outcomes, 2 may reveal the information about its type through its 
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actions. So, 1 can judge the truthfulness of 2's signals based on 2's actions. Thus, if 2 is 
proven to have lied, then 2 will lose its credibility in reporting truthful information (CT), 
and as a result 2 will lose θ > 0 amount of extra payoff since 2 cares about its credibility. 
For example, suppose there exists equilibrium in which 2 plays H when it is aggressive 
and plays D when it is normal. Then in these equilibrium outcomes, 1 can be certain that 
2 is aggressive when 2 has played H and that 2 is normal when 2 has played D.  In this 
case, if 2 has signaled A and plays D, or if 2 has signaled N and plays H, then 1 is certain 
that 2 has lied. Thus, 2 will lose its CT, and as a result 2 will lose the extra payoff θ. 
Formally, player 2's concern for its CT is modeled as follows. Let S1 and S2 be the 
pure-strategy spaces for 1 and 2, respectively, and let H be the set of all histories after all 
actions are taken, i.e. H   {H, D} x {A, N} x {H, D} where the first {H,D} is an action 
space for 1. Also, let 
≡
µ  : H x S1  x  S2 → [0, 1] be the posterior such that for each history 
h∈H and each strategy profile s ∈ S1 x S2,  µ (h, s) denotes the posterior probability 
that, according to Bayes' rule, 1 puts on 2's being hawkish at h when the players follow s. 
Finally, let [] :  —>Z be the greatest integer function, which assigns each x∈  the 
greatest integer less than or equal to x, and for each R
\ \
∈ {A, N}, let 1R : H x S1 x S2 —> 
{0,1} be the indicator function such that for each (h, s) ∈ H x S1 x S2, 1R (h, s) = 1 if and 
only if h  is a possible outcome under s and h includes R. Then, 2's concern for its CT is 
formulated by the Credibility-Loss function L :  S1 x S2  →   such that  \
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } Ls     1 1 1   1 N A hH
p h,s h,s p h,s h,s θµ µ
∈
=∑ + − − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
where θ measures how much 2 values its CT and L(s) denotes the expected payoff loss 
when the players follow s. This credibility-loss function reflects the principle of 
Presumption of Innocence, which means the accused is presumed to be innocent until 
proven guilty, by adopting the greatest integer function [ ].
1
To see how 2's credibility concern changes the results, first consider the case in which 
2 does not care about its CT.
2 Then, the game can have two possible outcomes in the 
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. First, if the probability p that 2 is aggressive 
satisfies 1
2 p ≥ , then the combination of outcomes HH and HD in which 1 always plays 
H and 2 plays D only when it is normal is possible in equilibrium. In these outcomes, l's 
expected payoff is 4−4p  (≥ 2) and 2's expected payoff is (1 ) pp β′+ − .  Second, the 
players can achieve the DH outcomes regardless of 2's type in which 1 plays D and 2 
plays  H.  In this outcome, l's expected payoff is one and 2's expected payoff is 
4(1 ) pp α′+− .  Therefore, if  1
2 p ≥ holds, then 1 prefers the former outcome 
combination to the latter because of the higher expected payoff in the former. Player 2's 
preference, on the other hand, depends on the parameters α′andβ′. 
                                                            
1 The credibility-loss function can reflect principles other than the presumption of Innocence. For example, if 
the greatest integer function is replaced with the least integer function, which assigns each  x∈R the least 
integer more than or equal to x , then the credibility-loss function would reflect the principle of Presumption of 
Guilt. 
   4 
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If 
                                          4(1 ) (1 ) pp p p αβ ′′ +−> + −                                           (1) 
 
holds, 2 prefers the latter outcome to the former. Then, how does 2's credibility concern 
change the results? Theorem 1 answers this question. 
 
Theorem 1 Pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria exist. If Inequality (1) holds, 
then in the equilibrium outcomes, player 1  plays only D and player 2 plays only H 
without losing its CT. 
Proof. Let (a,b)∈ S1 where a is an action when A has been signaled and b is an action 
when N has been signaled. In addition, let (a, b, c, d, e, f) ∈ S2 where a is a signal when 2 
is aggressive, b is a signal when 2 is normal, c is an action when 2 is aggressive and has 
signaled A, d is an action when 2 is aggressive and has signaled N, e is an action when 2 
is normal and has signaled A, and f is an action when 2 is normal and has signaled N. 
Next, every pure-strategy of player 1 is examined. 
First, let player 1 play (D,D). Note that when 2 is aggressive and has signaled A or 
when 2 is normal and has signaled N , 2 will not lose its CT regardless of its actions. 
So, 2's best response to (D,D) includes the actions ( , ⋅ , ⋅ H, , ⋅ , ⋅ H). Then, in the cases in 
which 2 is aggressive and has signaled N and in which 2 is normal and has signaled A, 2 
can avoid to lose its CT if 2 plays H. Thus, H becomes the best response in these cases 
because it is the best response in the absence of 2's credibility concern. That is, 2's best 
response to (D,D) must include the actions ( , ⋅ , ⋅ H, H, H, H). Here, (A, A, H, H ,H, H), 
(A, N, H, H, H, H), and (N, N, H, H, H, H) give 2 the expected payoff  4(1 ) pp α′+− . 
However, (N, A, H, H, H, H) gives 2 the expected payoff  4(1 ) pp α′+ − −θ because 2 
will lose its CT  under this strategy. So, (A, A, H, H, H, H),  (A. N, H, H, H),  and 
(N, N, H, H, H, H) are the best responses to l's strategy (D,D). Next, l's best response to 
(;  ; H, H, H, H) is (D,D). Therefore, 2's strategies (A, A, H, H, H, H), (A, N, H, H, H), 
and (N, N, H, H, H, H) constitute perfect Bayesian equilibria together with l's strategy 
(D, D). 
   5 
Second, let 1 play (D,H). Then, 2's best response includes ( , ⋅ , ⋅  H,  , ⋅ , ⋅  D). First, 
consider the case in which 2's best response to (D, H) can include (A,, ⋅  H,, D). In 
this case, (A  A  H,
⋅ , ⋅
, , , ⋅ H ,D) guarantees the better payoff to 2 than (A, N, H,   H,D) 
and (A, H,
, ⋅
, ⋅ , ⋅ D D) do. So, 2’s best response can include only (A,A,H,  H,D). 
Note that (A, A, H, H  H D) is the best response to (D H) in each continuation game, 
but (A, A, H,D H D) is not the best response in the continuation game in which 2 is 
aggressive and has signaled N. Next, l's best response to (A, A, H,H, H, D) can be 




, , ,, ⋅  H D), then 
(D  H) and (A,A,H H H,D) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Second, con-
sider the other case in which 2's best response to (D, H) can include (N,
,, ⋅ , ⋅
, , ,
, ⋅  H D). In 
this case, 2 can get pβ  + (1
,, ⋅ , ⋅
−p) by playing (N,N,H,D,, ⋅ D)  and can get p(β' θ) 
+(1−p)  by playing (N,N,H,H D).  Note that 2 can get
−
,, ⋅ 4(1 ) pp α′+ − by playing 
(A,A H  H,H D). If Inequality (1) holds, then  , , , 4(1 ) pp α′+ − > max {pβ + (1 p), 
p(β' θ)+(1 p)}. Thus, with respect to l's strategy (D,H), 2’s strategy (A, A, H, H, 
H, D) dominates the strategies including the signals and the actions (N,N H,, D). 
So   responding to (D,H)  2 will not play (N,N,H
−
− −
, ⋅ , ⋅
, , ,, ⋅ , ⋅ D).  If 2 plays Hanjoon Michael Jung / CMER Working Paper No. 08-61 
(N,A,H D) ,, ⋅ , ⋅ ,   then 2 would lose its CT  for sure, so 2 would play 
(N, A, H, H, H, D). Next  l's best response to (N, A, H, H, H, D) is not (D, H)  
but (H  H). Consequently, (D  H) and (N
, ,
, , ,, ⋅ H,, ⋅ , ⋅ D) can not constitute a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, if Inequality (1) holds and there exists a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium including (D H),  then in this equilibrium,2 will  play 
(A, A  H  H  H  D)  thus 1 will play only D and 2 will play only H without losing its 
CT in this equilibrium outcome. 
,
, , , , ,








Third let 1 play (H,D). Then  2's best response includes ( , N, H,, H ), and 
thus it must include ( N,H D H)  in order to be the best response in each 
continuation game. Here,together with (H,D),2’s strategy (A,N,H,
, ⋅
, ⋅ ,, ⋅ ,
, ⋅ D,H) cannot 
constitute an equilibrium because (A,N H,, ⋅ D,H)  causes player 1 to change its 
strategy from (H D) to (H,H). So if (H D) constitutes an equilibrium then 2's best 
response to (H,D)  must include (N,N H,
, , ,
, D,H)   and thus it must be 
(N,N H H D H) because it produces the higher payoff to 2 than (N,N,H,D,D,H) 
does. Therefore if (H D) is part of an equilibrium,then in this equilibrium outcome 1 
will play only D and 2 will play only H without losing its CT. 
, ,
, , ,
Finally let 1 play (H H). Then 2's best response includes ( , , , , ⋅ H,, ⋅ , ⋅ D). If 2 plays 
(⋅ H,H D D) then 2 would signal truthfully, i.e., (A,N,H,H,D,D),since 
untruthful signals only cause player 2 to lose its CT.  Then,responding to 
(A,N,H H D,D), 1 would have an incentive to change its strategy from (H,H) to 
(D H).  If 2 plays (
, , ,
, ,
, ⋅ , ⋅ H,, ⋅ H,D)  or (A,N,H,D D,D) then 1 would have an 
incentive to change its strategy from (H H) to (D,
,
, ⋅). In addition, with respect to l's 
strategy (H, H), 2's strategy (A, N, H, H, D, D) dominates (A, A, H, D, D, D), 
(N,A,H D D,D), and (N N H,D,D,D), and thus these strategies cannot be the 
best response to (H,H).  Therefore, there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium that 
includes l's strategy (H,H). This completes th
, , , ,
e proof. 
Theorem 1 means that if player 2 prefers the DH outcome to the combination of 
outcomes  HH  and  HD   which is shown in Inequality (1)  and if 2 cares about its 
CT,which means θ > 0, then only the DH outcome is possible in pure-strategy perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium and 2 can still maintain its CT. Thus,2 successfully manipulates its 
information without being detected. This is because 2 can influence 1to play D according 
to its preferences. In this model,1 cannot completely ignore 2's signal because of 2's 
credibility concern. Once 1 responds to 2's signal, 2 can influence l's actions by 
manipulating its information.  Therefore  this model shows that 2's credibility concern 
can paradoxically endow 2 with an invisible power to successfully manipulate its 




2 , player 1 loses its favored outcomes in 
equilibrium. 
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This result is strong in that it does not depend on p (> 0), the probability that 2 is 
aggressive, and θ (> 0), the value that 2 puts on its CT.  That is, no matter how small  
but positive, the probability of 2's being aggressive is or no matter how great 2's concern 
for its CT is  player 1 cannot achieve the combination of outcomes HH and HD. In 
addition  this result can be generalized so that we can replace the setting of the model, 
the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information, with a general coordination or anti-
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Furthermore, we can extend this model by introducing an aggressive type for player 
1 and allowing 1 to signal its type before they play the Hawk-Dove game. In this case, if 
1 does not care about its CT, then Theorem 1 holds for this extended model regardless of 
their signaling ways; sequentially or simultaneously.  On the other hand, if 1 cares about 
its CT, then the results might change. In particular, if both players care about their CT 
slightly so that aggressive players have a dominant action H regardless of their credibility 
loss,  i.e.  θ  1, then no pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists.  This is 
because both players have the same power to control the other's actions, and so the game 
becomes a discoordination situation. For example, if they try to play the DH outcome 
when they are both normal, then 1 has an incentive to reveal its type because of its 
credibility concern. Then, when 1 reveals it as an aggressive type, normal player 2 has an 
incentive to change its action from H to D. Then by manipulating its information, 1 can 
make 2 play D, and thus they would play the HD outcome when they are both normal. 
Then again, 2 has an incentive to reveal its type and the story repeats the previous 
reasoning. Therefore, in this case, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. 

In Theorem 1, the sufficient and necessary condition for the unique outcome DH in 
equilibrium is that i)  4(1 ) pp α′+−> pβ + (1−p) and  4(1 ) pp α′+ −  > p(β'  θ) +(1 p) 
or ii) θ < 3. So, it is possible that 2 prefers the combination of outcomes HH and HD to 
the DH outcome, but 2 cannot achieve the combination in equilibrium. This is because 
the normal player 2 always prefers the DH outcome to the HD outcome and so it tries to 
manipulate its information. As a result, if 2 prefers the DH  outcome to the other 
outcomes, or if the aggressive player 2 cannot effectively force the normal player 2 not to 
manipulate its information, the unique outcome in equilibrium will be the DH outcome. 
The former situation is formulated in the condition i) above and the latter situation is 
formulated in the condition ii)  above. In this model, however, a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium exists for limited parameters and the outcomes in the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium can result in player l's playing H with positive probabilities. Moreover, if the 
presumption of innocence is replaced with another principle, such as the presumption of 
guilt, and also if θ is large enough, then 2 might signal its type truthfully, and as a result 







Suppose that a sender and a receiver play the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete  
information and the sender cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information. 
Then, the sender can make the receiver play the sender's favored outcome without losing 
its credibility by manipulating its information. 
                                                            
   7 
3 In application, any principle other than the presumption of innocence causes a fatal problem. This is because, 
in reality, the receiver can observe only outcomes, but not strategies. So, the receiver cannot check whether it 
correctly forecasts the sender’s strategy. However, any principle other than the presumption of innocence 
postulates that the receiver can check whether it correctly forecasts the sender’s strategy. Hanjoon Michael Jung / CMER Working Paper No. 08-61 
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The findings derived from the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information can be 
extended to a general coordination or anti-coordination game with incomplete in-
formation. This is because, just like the receiver in the Hawk-Dove game, receivers in the 
general coordination or anti-coordination game cannot completely ignore the signal from 
a sender due to the sender's credibility concern. As a result, the sender can successfully 
influence the receivers to play the sender's favored outcomes by manipulating 
information. Hanjoon Michael Jung / CMER Working Paper No. 08-61 
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